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Evidence for the National Banking 
Era, 1880-1914 
Michael D. Bordo, Peter Rappoport, and 
Anna J. Schwartz 
6.1  Introduction 
The provisions of the Aqts of  1863 and  1865 that established the national 
banking system were designed to remedy two perceived defects of the ante- 
bellum state banking systems. One was the circulation of a wide variety of 
state bank notes, often at a discount, which made for an inefficient payments 
system. The second defect was instability of the note issue, marked by  over- 
issue, bank runs and failures, and periodic suspensions of convertibility  into 
specie. To  remedy the first defect, state bank notes were replaced by national 
bank  issues of  U.S. bond-secured  currency.  To  remedy  the  second  defect, 
stringent  reserve and capital requirements,  oversight,  and regulation  by the 
Comptroller of the Currency were conditions for national bank charters. Un- 
fortunately,  the remedies  did not  work  as intended  by  the architects of the 
national banking system. Instead, the system was characterized by monetary 
and cyclical instability,  four banking panics,  frequent stock market crashes, 
and other financial disturbances. 
In this paper we examine the evidence for two competing views-monetar- 
ist and credit-rationing-on  how monetary and financial disturbances influ- 
enced the real economy during the national  banking era. These views stress 
either the asset or the liability side of  the banking system’s balance sheet as 
the way in which monetary shocks are transmitted. 
According  to  the  monetarist  view,  the  way  in  which  monetary  distur- 
bances-such  as gold flows and banking panics in the national banking era- 
affected the  real  economy  was through  changes on the  liability  side of  the 
banking system’s balance sheet.  I  Changes in bank deposits impinge directly 
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and indirectly (through changing interest rates) on spending, while the com- 
position of bank portfolios (reflected on the asset side of the balance sheet) is 
not important in explaining transmission. 
According to the alternative, credit-rationing view, the composition of the 
asset side is important: changes in bank loans and other credit variables,  in- 
dependent of changes in the quantity of  money, are the determinants of real 
fluctuations in the national banking period.* Banks engage in credit rationing 
rather than raise interest rates because in a world of asymmetric information, 
a rise in interest rates may encourage adverse selection, that is, borrowing by 
individuals and firms more likely to default. This approach follows an older 
tradition stressing the asset side of the balance sheet.3 
Theoretically, credit rationing has been cast as an equilibrium concept. Sev- 
eral authors have suggested that changes in the equilibrium quantity of credit 
rationing  can explain short-run fluctuations  in real  The idea is that 
changes in the “level of uncertainty” in the economy induce changes in the 
equilibrium quantity of loans, and thereby affect real activity. 
Recently  Charles Calomiris and Glenn Hubbard provided  support for the 
credit-rationing view for the national banking peri~d.~  We have followed their 
approach but expand their simultaneous equations model by considering ad- 
ditional factors that could explain the link they find between credit and the 
real economy. Our evidence suggests that it is difficult to distinguish between 
the two views. When monetary variables are introduced into the credit model, 
money is significant and credit declines in importance though its contribution 
is not eliminated.  When  credit variables  are introduced into the  monetarist 
model, money is robust but credit effects are also significant. 
The inconclusive  simultaneous  equations results  have  led us  to examine 
institutional data for the national banking period for evidence that helps distin- 
guish between the two views. The key feature is the intimate connection be- 
tween the stock market and the national banking system. A substantial frac- 
tion of the reserves of all national banks ended up being invested in the New 
York City call loan market. We show that loans secured by stock in New York 
City were volatile, but other loans were not. A similar but more muted pattern 
is found for the United States as a whole. Yet other loans comprise direct loans 
2. Charles W.  Calomiris and R. Glenn Hubbard, “Price Flexibility, Credit Availability, and 
Economic Fluctuations: Evidence from the United States, 18944909,”  Quarterly  Journal ofEco- 
nomics 104 (Aug. 1989), pp. 429-52. 
3. Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Informa- 
tion,” American Economic Review 71 (June 1981), pp. 393-410;  “Credit Rationing with Many 
Borrowers,”Arnerican Economic Review 77 (Mar. 1987), pp. 228-3  1; Mark Gertler and R. Glenn 
Hubbard, “Financial Factors in  Business Fluctuations,” in Financial Market  Volatiliry (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1988). pp. 33-71. 
4. Ben Bernanke, “Alternative Explanations of  the Money-Income Correlation,” Camegie- 
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 25 (Autumn 1986), pp. 49-99;  Calomiris and Hub- 
bard, “Price Flexibility,” pp. 429-52. 
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to businesses  and so are the principal  candidates for credit effects,  if  such 
effects were present. 
This pattern suggests that disturbances in the stock market were mirrored 
in the call loan market,  which in turn dominated total New York City bank 
loans and, to a lesser extent, total U.S. loans. Thus the significant influence 
of bank loans found in credit models may simply be reflecting volatility in the 
stock market. To test this possibility, we introduce a stock price index and the 
call loan rate into a simultaneous equations model incorporating  both  loans 
and money. The effect is to reduce greatly the influence of bank loans on real 
activity. The influence of money, however, remains robust. 
The rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as follows.  Section 6.2 explains  the 
money and credit-rationing  views.  We  first set out the credit-rationing  story 
and contrast it with the money story. We  then trace the effects to be expected 
from various  shocks according  to the two views,  beginning  with the  more 
familiar modern setting in which a central bank engages in open market sales 
that reduce bank reserves and money supply, with contractionary effects on 
national income. Then we turn to a gold standard setting, subject to gold out- 
flows, in which banking panics occur.  Section 6.3 reviews past attempts to 
assess the roles of money and credit in the transmission mechanism, and then 
turns to the empirical results of four simultaneous equations models of quar- 
terly data that we present to test the two views. 
In section 6.4 we examine the role of the stock and call loan markets. We 
describe the relation between the inverted pyramid of  credit and the call loan 
market. Data from the Comptroller of the Currency’s annual reports reveal the 
diverse pattern of loans secured by stock and of other bank loans. We present 
a simultaneous equations model incorporating stock market variables, money, 
and U.S. loans. Section 6.5 summarizes the paper,  drawing lessons for re- 
search strategy. 
6.2  Money versus Credit-Rationing: Theory 
A considerable  theoretical  and empirical literature exists on whether the 
monetary  system affects the real economy  through  the liability  or the asset 
side of the banking system.6 
Emphasis on bank credit as an alternative or additional channel to money 
goes back to Adam Smith and the classical economists. The real bills doctrine 
that dominated both nineteenth and early twentieth century thinking stressed 
that bank  lending  based  strictly on self-liquidating commercial bills  would 
always  be  sufficient to finance economic activity. John Maynard  Keynes in 
The General Theory suggested the possibility of credit rationing. That sugges- 
6. For a useful survey, see Mark Certler, “Financial Structure and Aggregate Economic Activ- 
ity: An Overview,”Journal of  Money, CredirandBanking 20 (Aug. 1988, pt. 2), pp. 559-88. 192  M. D. Bordo, P.  Rappoport, and A. J. Schwartz 
tion led to the availability doctrine, whereby the Federal Reserve would influ- 
ence the availability of bank loans through its open market operations.’  It was 
assumed  that changes in bank  deposits would be offset by  substitution into 
nonmonetary assets. Hence the only way the monetary authorities could affect 
spending was by influencing total credit.8  A modem proponent of these views 
bases them on extensive empirical evidence showing a close connection be- 
tween various credit aggregates and economic a~tivity.~ 
In the past decade, various authors have given a new impetus to the credit 
approach. Based  on  the theory of  incomplete  information  and  the  seminal 
“lemons” article, they have argued for a theory of  “equilibrium credit ration- 
ing.” lo In their view, the market for loans is a customer market where factors 
other than price are important, unlike the auction markets which characterize 
many  other commodities. Specifically,  because  of  asymmetric  information 
available  to lenders and borrowers, a rise in the loan rate, by encouraging 
adverse selection (a predominance of loan applicants with risky projects) and 
moral hazard (engaging in risky behavior after receiving a loan) on the part of 
borrowers,  can increase the incidence of defaults and reduce the real return 
earned by the lenders. Under these circumstances, banks will charge a “lem- 
ons premium”  to highly  qualified  borrowers, causing  them  to reduce their 
borrowing, and will  restrict  loans to marginal  borrowers.  With equilibrium 
credit rationing, loan rates will not rise to clear the loan market. The supply 
curve is backward bending. In a macro setting, this theory predicts that re- 
strictive monetary  policy will lead to a reduction in bank  lending with little 
influence  on  interest  rates.  Extensions  of  this  approach  view  commercial 
banks as important because they use their expertise to screen borrowers, and 
hence reduce the information  asymmetry. One device used is the posting of 
collateral.  In this context, restrictive  monetary  policy,  if  it produces  bank- 
ruptcy  and declines in net worth because  of debt deflation,  will disrupt the 
valuable credit-intermediation  network created by the banking system, further 
reducing bank lending and economic activity. 
With these views in mind, we trace the transmission of both monetary and 
7.  Robert  Roosa, “Interest  Rates  and  the Central  Bank,” in Money,  Trade and  Economic 
Growth: Essays in Honor of John H.  Williams (New York, 1951), pp. 270-95. 
8. Committee  on  the  Working of  the  Monetary  System  (Radcliffe), Report,  Cmnd.  827 
(H.M.S.O., 1959); Commission on  Money and Credit, Money and Credit: Their Influence on 
Jobs, Prices, and Growth (New York,  1961); John Gurley and Edward Shaw, Money in a Theory 
ofFinance (Washington, D.C., 1960). 
9. Benjamin Friedman, “Debt and Economic Activity in the United States,” in B. Friedman, 
ed.,  The Changing Role of  Debt and  Equiry  in  Financing  US.  Capital Formation  (Chicago, 
1982). 
10. Stiglitz and Weiss, “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,” pp. 393- 
410; “Credit Rationing with Many Borrowers,” pp. 228-3  I; Joseph Stiglitz, “Money, Credit and 
Business Fluctuations,” The EconomicRecord 64 (Dec. 1988). pp. 307-22;  George Akerlof, “The 
Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 84 (Aug. 1970), pp. 488-500. 
11. Ben Bemanke, “Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Collapse in the Propagation of  the 
Great Depression,” American Economic Review 73 (June 1983), pp. 257-76. 193  Money vs. Credit Rationing 
real shocks according to the money and credit-rationing views. We  initially 
focus on a modem setting, and then on the pre-Federal  Reserve System and 
the classical gold standard. 
6.2.1  The Modem Setting 
We compare the two views of transmission, first, following an open market 
sale of  government securities and second, following an unexpected decline in 
exports. 
An Open Market Sale of  Government Securities 
In the simplest version of the money view, an open market sale reduces the 
reserves of  the commercial banks (we neglect the distinction between bor- 
rowed and nonborrowed reserves). In the face of declining reserves (assuming 
no excess reserves), the banks sell investments and call in (do not renew) their 
loans. As a result deposits decline. The decline in deposits leads to a fall in 
expenditures, which in turn reduces output and the price level. Rising market 
interest rates as well as implicit rates connecting assets to service flows will 
be a key conduit connecting money supply to spending. This approach as- 
sumes  that  deposits  and  other  financial  assets  are  not  close  substitutes, 
whereas loans and other earning assets are.I2 
In  the credit view, the open market sale reduces reserves and leads to a 
decline in bank  loans (presumably, because loans and  investments are not 
close substitutes, the former decline more). As in the money view, deposits 
are reduced, but because of a high degree of substitution between transaction 
balances and near-monies, there is little effect from this source on spending. 
In the approach put forward by Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, as the de- 
cline in lending threatens to raise interest rates, the danger of adverse selection 
and moral hazard increases for lenders, so banks reduce their lending further 
(they engage in credit rationing). If  the contractionary policy leads to bank- 
ruptcies, a stock market crash, or deflation, then the decline in the net worth 
of firms subjects lenders to greater moral hazard and increases adverse selec- 
tion. The reduction in the value of  collateral can lead to further declines in 
bank loans. 
12. The story can be complicated by distinguishing between certificates of deposit and other 
deposits, with the former being close substitutes for marketable securities. In this case, as Eugene 
F. Fama, “What’s Different About Banks?” Journal ofMonetary Economics  15 (Jan. 1985), pp. 
24-39,  and Christina Romer and David Romer, “New Evidence on the Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism,” Brookings Papers on Economic Acfivify  1 (1990). pp. 149-213,  have demonstrated, 
if the reserve requirements on certificates of  deposit were the same as on demand deposits, the 
reduction in bank liabilities would have no effect on interest rates and bank loans would dominate 
in the transmission mechanism. Since reserve requirements on certificates of  deposit are consid- 
erably lower than on demand deposits, this is unlikely. 
According to Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, loans and other assets (bonds) are not perfect 
substitutes (see Brunner and Meltzer, “Friedman’s Monetary Theory,” in Robe?  J. Gordon, ed., 
Milton Friedman’s Monetary Framework: A Debate with His Critics (Chicago, 1976), pp. 63-76. 
They construct a monetarist model including a credit market, in which the effects of  money dom- 
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Both views assume that the central bank will act as a lender of last resort to 
prevent the onset of  a banking  panic.  The two views differ, however,  with 
respect to the empirical behavior of interest rates and loan aggregates at the 
business cycle peak. According to the money view, money growth decelerates 
during mid-expansion  and is accompanied by a rise in interest rates that per- 
sists beyond the business cycle peak and well into the recession phase.  Ac- 
cording to the credit-rationing  view, interest rates do not exhibit this pattern 
because  of  the  adverse  selection  problems  banks  are assumed  to confront 
should  interest  rates rise.  According to the  money  view,  the  allocation of 
credit between  loans and investments in bank portfolios has no effect on the 
aggregate  of  deposits. Banks expand  their portfolios  and deposits with the 
availability  of reserves.  According  to the credit-rationing  view, banks with- 
draw from loan expansion when their attitude toward loan applicants hardens. 
It is precisely  that behavior  which proponents  of this theory claim causes a 
contraction of the economy. 
A Decline in Exports 
The outcome of a transitory real shock, such as a decline in exports, ac- 
cording to the money view, depends on the actions of the central bank. In the 
absence of a shock to bank reserves, banks will hold excess reserves and will 
lower interest rates. If demand for loans does not increase in response to the 
interest  rate  decline,  banks  will  expand their  portfolio  of  investments.  A 
stable money supply and lower interest rates will eventually provide a stimu- 
lus to the economy. 
In the credit view, a transitory real shock that lowers the demand for loans 
may be exacerbated if the degree of uncertainty is affected.I3 If uncertainty is 
increased, this will cause banks to reduce their lending further, because of the 
adverse  selection  and moral  hazard  problems  mentioned  above.  Unlike the 
money view, the credit-rationing view, as represented by Stiglitz, provides no 
role  for accommodating monetary  policy  to mitigate  the  effects  of  a  real 
shock.  l4 
6.2.2  The National Banking Era 
In  the  pre-Federal  Reserve  setting, two key  institutional  differences af- 
fected the transmission mechanism: the absence of a central bank and the clas- 
sical gold standard. The first factor was important because an effective lender 
of last resort did not exist.” The importance of the second factor was that a 
13. William W.  Lang and Leonard I. Nakamura, “The Dynamics of Credit Markets in a Model 
with  Learning,” Journal  of  Monetary Economics  26  (Jan.  1990).  pp.  305-18;  and  Stiglitz, 
“Money, Credit and Business Fluctuations.” 
14. Stiglitz, “Money, Credit and Business Fluctuations.” 
15. On a number of  occasions, the clearing houses, a consortium of  large New  York  City 
commercial banks, and the U.S. Treasury performed this role. 195  Money vs. Credit Rationing 
gold outflow, induced typically either by  a rise in Bank Rate by the Bank of 
England or by a severe harvest failure-a  real shock that led to a deficit in the 
current account-reduced  monetary gold reserves. 
A Gold Outjlow 
If the Bank of England raised its discount rate, a short-term capital outflow 
from the United States ensued, as did a gold outflow that reduced the reserves 
of the commercial banks.  l6 According to the money view, both loans and in- 
vestments declined, pari passu with deposits, interest rates rose, and spending 
declined along with output and prices. A key difference from the modern set- 
ting could, however, arise. There was no ready source of high-powered money 
to replace the loss of monetary reserves. In addition, if the external drain was 
also accompanied by  an internal drain, such as a seasonally induced demand 
for reserves by  country national banks,  the possibility  arose  of  a banking 
panic generated by  a decline in the public’s deposit-currency ratio as well as 
the banking system’s deposit-reserve ratio.  l7 This could produce a further de- 
cline in the money supply. Resultant bank failures could lead to bankruptcies, 
reductions in firms’ net worth, and further bank failures, as the value of bank 
assets declined. This process could continue unless some authority intervened 
as a lender of  last resort or the convertibility of  deposits into currency was 
suspended. 
In  the credit view,  the decline in bank reserves reduced loans (more than 
investments and more than deposits), as it would today, but the incipient rise 
in interest rates could lead to credit rationing because of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. The fall in activity and the price level would reduce the value 
of  bank collateral, causing a further reduction  in bank loans. If  a banking 
panic ensued, this exacerbated the process, leading to a rise in the cost of 
intermediation. A stock market crash also would reduce the net  worth  and 
collateral of firms, in turn reducing bank lending. 
A Harvest Failure 
In the money view, a transitory real shock such as a harvest failure reduced 
output. If  country banks withdrew reserve balances from their city correspon- 
dents and reduced loans and deposits, the national banking system contracted. 
A fortuitous short-term capital inflow from abroad could, however, cut short 
this process of decline. If the inflow did not occur, interest rates fell, leading 
16. Friedman and Schwartz, A Monerary History, chap. 3.  See section 6.4  below for an elabo- 
ration of  the institutional framework of the U.S. banking system in this period. 
17. For alternative explanations of banking panics in this period, see Michael D. Bordo, “The 
Contribution of A Monetary History of  rhe  United States, 1867-1960  to Monetary History,” in 
Michael D. Bordo, ed.,  Money, History, and Internarional Finance: Essays in Honor of  Anna J. 
Schwartz (Chicago, 1989), pp. 15-70; and Charles W.  Calomiris and Gary Gorton, “The Origins 
of  Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation,” in  R. Glenn Hubbard, ed.,  Financial 
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to a gold outflow. The gold outflow reduced the money supply, output, and the 
price level until equilibrium was restored. If a banking panic ensued, further 
declines in the money supply occurred. 
In the credit-rationing view, the story is the same for the modern period and 
the national banking era. The real shock reduced the demand for loans and the 
level of  interest  rates. If  uncertainty  increased, bank  lending  would  be re- 
duced, reflecting  adverse  selection  and moral  hazard.  If  bankruptcies,  de- 
clines in net worth, and debt deflation ensued, then further declines in bank 
lending occurred. Finally, if the real shock caused a stock market crash, then 
equity rationing might follow, as declines in the net worths of firms made it 
harder for them to obtain external finance.18 
6.3  Money versus Credit: Some Empirical Results 
An  early  approach to these  issues  compared correlations  between  bank 
loans (and other credit aggregates) and economic activity, and those between 
various  monetary aggregates and activity  in  the post-World  War  I1 United 
States, with the result that credit usually dominated.19 Two later studies based 
on Granger-causality  tests and standard vector autoregressions (VARs) led to 
the conclusion that both money and credit together explain variations in real 
The Granger-causality  tests examine the reduced-form predictive power of 
money and credit variables,  which is not necessarily the same as their causal 
role. In particular, it is necessary to abstract from contemporaneous effects of 
output on financial variables. One approach was to run a race between money 
and credit by identifying  episodes in the post-World  War  I1 period when a 
contractionary  monetary  policy was adopted independent of the state of  the 
real economy.21  In this approach, univariate forecasting regressions lead to the 
conclusion that money is an active force in transmission,  with bank lending a 
reflecting force. 
Another approach, using  structural  VARs,  makes  explicit  allowance for 
contemporaneous interactions between output and credit and money, and finds 
that  bank  loans account for at  least as much  of  the  variance  of  output  as 
output  .2O 
18. Dwight Jaffee and Joseph Stiglitz, “Credit Rationing,” in Benjamin M. Friedman and Frank 
H. Hahn, eds., Handbook  of  Monetary  Economics, vol.  2  (Amsterdam,  1990), chap. 16, pp. 
838-98. 
19. Friedman, “Debt and Economic Activity.” 
20. Benjamin Friedman, “Monetary Policy with a Credit Aggregate Target,’’ Carnegie Roches- 
ter Conference Series on Public Policy  18 (1983), pp.  117-18,  and “The Roles of  Money and 
Credit in Macroeconomic Analysis,” in Macroeconomics, Prices and Quantities, James Tobin, 
ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution), pp.  161-99. Stephen King, “Monetary Transmis- 
sion: Through Bank Loans or Bank Liabilities?’ Journal of Money, Credit and Banking  18 (Aug. 
1986), pp. 290-303,  in his VAR found that money dominated credit. The relationship of  VARs to 
other methods of  estimating simultaneous equations systems is discussed below. 
21. Romer and Romer, “Monetary Transmission Mechanism,” pp. 149-213. 197  Money  vs. Credit Rationing 
money. Subsequently the approach was applied to the pre-1914  national bank- 
ing era.** 
Assessing the relative merits of  the money and credit-rationing explana- 
tions requires that one disentangle a complex set of  interactions among eco- 
nomic variables. This task is complicated by  different views about the struc- 
ture of these interactions held by the two schools of thought. In this section of 
the paper, we use a structural VAR  approach to analyze a number of different 
models of  the  relationships among the variables of  central concern to the 
money and credit views. 
Structural VARs involve a strategy for identifying parameters in a simulta- 
neous equations model that preserves some of the intent of the original Cowles 
Commission approach, while remaining sensitive to Christopher Sims’s criti- 
cism of the “incredible” identification assumptions it neces~itated.~~  The cost 
of  this compromise is that the structural VAR  approach requires the investi- 
gator to have great faith in the validity of all apects of the model. 
The structural and reduced forms of  a linear simultaneous system can be 
expressed as 
(1)  y,r + X,B  = v,  E(V,‘VJ = I: 
(2)  Y, = x,n + u, 
n = -Br-J  (3) 
(4)  u,r = v, 
(5)  E(u’,u,)  = r-1’  a-1  = s1 
Here, Y,  and X,  are row vectors, respectively, of observations on the K endog- 
enous and M  exogenous or predetermined variables. U,  and V,  are K-element 
row vectors of reduced form and structural errors, respectively. The structural 
parameters are contained in the matrices r,  B, and 2,  whose respective di- 
mensions are K X  K, M X  K, and K  X  K, while n and 0  are M X  K and K 
x  K matrices of reduced-form coefficients that can be estimated consistently 
from ordinary least squares regression of  Y on X. 
Identification is accomplished by placing sufficient restrictions on the struc- 
tural coefficient matrices-that  a unique solution for r,  B, and I: is possible 
22. This approach was first applied in this context by Bemanke, “Money-Income  Correlation,” 
pp. 49-99.  The Bemanke method was applied to the pre-national  banking era by Calomiris and 
Hubbard, “Price Flexibility,”  pp. 429-52. 
23. Structural VARs were conceived by Bemanke, “Money-Income  Correlation,” and Christo- 
pher Sims, “Are Forecasting Models Usable for Policy Analysis?” Federal Reserve Bank ofMin- 
neapolis Quarterly Review (Winter 1986), pp. 2-16.  For a discussion of the Cowles Commission 
approach, see Thomas Cooley and Stephen LeRoy, “Atheoretical Macroeconomics:  A Critique,” 
Journal  ofMonetary Economics 16 (Nov. 1985), pp. 283-308.  For his criticism, see Christopher 
Sims, “Macroeconomics  and Reality,” Econornetrica 48 (Jan. 1980). pp. 1-48. 198  M. D. Bordo, P.  Rappoport, and A. J. Schwartz 
from equations (3) and (5),  given Il and 
to identification can be summarized as: 
(a)  Restrict r and B, and leave 2 unrestricted (Cowles). 
(b)  After ordering  the endogenous variables  in a  suitable manner,  make 
(c) Impose K(K - 1) restrictions on r and 2,  and leave B unrestricted (struc- 
The rationale for the Cowles approach was that the structural errors contained 
the effects of variables not captured by the model, and since there could be no 
presumption that the same variables had not been omitted from more than one 
equation, one would expect the elements of  V,  to be correlated contempora- 
neously. This implied that a total of K(K - 1) zero restrictions needed to be 
placed on the r and B matrices. 
Sims criticized  this  approach, arguing  that  it  was difficult to believe  the 
exclusion restrictions typically used, especially in the light of rational expec- 
tations models that  conditioned  people’s  behavior,  and therefore observable 
variables,  on all  available  past  data.25  He  advanced  the  standard  VAR  ap- 
proach,  without  claiming it  represented  structural  relationships.  However, 
several authors argued that little meaningful could be said unless a structural 
interpretation  were  placed  on the  triangular  form of  r used  in  Sims’s  ap- 
proach, which, in turn, did not seem plausible.26 
The structural VAR approach adopts Sims’s skepticism concerning restric- 
tions on B, but sides with the Cowles approach in maintaining that restrictions 
on r are sensible. There are K(K -  1) free elements in r,  which is the number 
of  restrictions required for identification. The fewer restrictions placed on r, 
the  more  must  be  imposed  on 2.  Typically, the  maximum  of  K(K - 1)/2 
restrictions are placed on 2,  making it diag~nal.~’  This strains credibility from 
the Cowles viewpoint,  since it does not allow for correlation among variables 
omitted from equations: it is tantamount to an extreme expression of faith in 
the specification of the model. 
In identifying the models that follow, we use the diagonal-C structural VAR 
strategy. This, in turn, necessitates that K(K - 1)/2 of the elements of r be 
zero. Since we are very far from believing any of  these models to be the last 
word, we shall attempt to trace patterns that are consistent with the results of 
all the models. 
The three prominent approaches 
triangular, 2 diagonal, and leave B unrestricted (standard VAR). 
tural VAR). 
24. Aside from K  restrictions on r that normalize to unity the coefficient of one endogenous 
25. Sims, “Macroeconomics and Reality,” pp. 1-48. 
26. The authors  include Cooley  and Leroy, “Atheoretical Macroeconomics,” pp.  283-308; 
Rodney L. Jacobs, Edward Learner, and Michael P.  Ward, “Difficulties with Testing for Causa- 
tion,” Economic Znquiry  17 (July  1979). pp.  401-13;  and  Bernanke,  “Money-Income Correla- 
tion,” pp. 49-99. 
27. An  exception is Bernanke, “Money-Income Correlation,” who, in  a six-variable system, 
permits one off-diagonal element of c to be non-zero. 
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In all, we present four models in this section. The first two specifications 
we estimate include only the variables considered relevant to the determina- 
tion of real output by proponents of the money and credit views, respectively. 
The drawback with these models is that neither allows for the effects of  vari- 
ables considered  important by the other story: neither is sufficiently rich  to 
distinguish  the roles  of  the asset  and  liability  sides of  the banks’  balance 
sheets. In order to compare the merits of the two stories, we need to nest the 
two models in a larger model. Unfortunately,  such a system would be com- 
putationally intractable, and so we present a separate generalization for each 
model. 
All models are estimated using quarterly data spanning the period 1880.1  to 
1914.W All variables except those involving interest rates enter the estimated 
models as quarterly rates of  change, but, for the sake of  brevity, we refer to 
these changes as M2, real GNP, etc. The sources of the data series used are 
described in the Appendix. The same estimation procedure is used for all the 
structural  VAR  specifications  that we examine, and it will prove useful to 
describe it in detail in the context of the first model we discuss. 
6.3.1  Monetarist Model 
Our basic monetarist model involves five variables, the monetary base, M2, 
real GNP, the commercial paper rate, and the GNP deflator. Thus the vector Y, 
in equation (1) is a row vector with five elements, the observations at time t 
on these five variables. The first step in implementing the structural VAR ap- 
proach is to run a vector autoregression of the system, which is equivalent to 
estimating the reduced-form  (2). The variables in XI  are four lagged values of 
each of  the five variables,  a constant  term, time trend, and three  seasonal 
dummies. These reduced-form regressions produce estimates of the reduced 
form errors,  U,, which are related to the structural errors, V,,  by the linear 
transformation r,  as shown in equation (4). The object of the second stage of 
the estimation procedure is to extract estimates of r and E from the estimated 
reduced-form errors, essentially by using equation (5),  which shows how the 
covariance matrix of U,  is related to these two parameter matrices.28  Equation 
(5) contains [K + K(K - 1)/2] (that is, 15) distinct relationships. Before the 
imposition of identification restrictions,  has [K + K(K -  1)/2] (15)  distinct 
parameters, and r has K2 (25). For a unique solution to equation (5),  K2  (25) 
restrictions on the parameters  are required (to produce as many equations as 
28. The  actual  estimation procedure  used  is full  information maximum  likelihood  (FIML) 
which converges in probability to  the same values as the “method of moments” solution of equa- 
tion (5) mentioned in the text. FIML minimizes the concentrated likelihood function: 
over the unrestricted elements in I-.  The sample covariance matrix of U,,  R, is used in place of R, 
for which  it is a.c?nsistent estimator. The covariance matrix of the structural errors, I,  is then 
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unknowns). As discussed above, K (5) of these come from normalizing diag- 
onal elements of r to unity, [K(K - 1)/2] (10) come from restricting C.  to be 
diagonal, and the remaining [K(K - 1)/2] (10) come from setting elements of 
r to zero. The last type of restriction is a limitation on the contemporaneous 
interactions among  variable^.^^  Equivalently, in  view of  equation (4), it  in- 
volves restrictions on  the way  the observable reduced-form errors,  U,, are 
composed of the unobserved structural errors, V,. 
Using the letters b, m, y, i, and p  to refer to the base, M2, real GNP, com- 
mercial paper rate, and GNP deflator, respectively, and g,,  = -  T,, , the con- 
temporaneous interactions we identify in the monetarist model are30 
Ub  = glT’u, + gi;’  up +  Vb 
u,  = g:;’u,  + gk,’  u, +  v, 
= gpd, + gi;’  u, + 
= g$,’u,  + g;;’  u, + v, 
u, 
u, 
up + v, 
up = g;;’  urn + vp 
The monetarist model allows the base to be  affected contemporaneously 
only by  interest rate and price shocks, reflecting the operation of  the gold 
~tandard.~’  Increases in the interest rate and decreases in the inflation rate are 
postulated to increase the base, via capital inflows. Some authors have argued 
that, during this period, interest rate and price shocks from abroad were re- 
flected fully and  quickly in domestic interest rate  and  price 
These effects are allowed for by  the interest rate and price channels included 
in the base equation. This explains why it is unnecessary to include explicit 
open economy variables. The money multiplier drives the dependence of the 
money supply on the base, while liquidity preference accounts for the pres- 
ence of the interest rate. The presence of  M2 in the output equation reflects 
demand shocks, and the interest rate and inflation rate are inserted to allow for 
the possibility of supply side, or real interest rate shocks. The interest rate is 
influenced by M2 and real output as a result of the demand for money. Finally, 
inflation is driven by  shocks to the quantity of money. Notice that, since 2  is 
assumed to be diagonal, the shocks to each variable (vb,  v,,  etc.) are assumed 
independent of each other. 
The estimates of  the contemporaneous interactions are shown in the top 
29. The ith column of r contains the contemporaneous coefficients in the structural equation 
for the ith variable. Thus, in the monetarist model for example, one would impose the restriction 
that M2 does not contemporaneously affect the base by restricting r21  to be zero. 
30. The signs are those of the gt, terms. Since Kequals 5 in the monetarist model, ten of the off- 
diagonal elements of r are restricted to be zero. 
3 1. We also ran the model with gold flows in place of the monetary base. The results are similar 
to those with the base, though less pronounced. 
32. See Donald N. McCloskey and J. Richard Zecher, “How the Gold Standard Worked,” in 
Jacob A. Frenkel and Harry G. Johnson, eds., The Monetary Approach to the Balance of  Pay- 
ments (Toronto, 1976), pp. 357-85. 201  Money vs. Credit Rationing 
panel of  Table 6.1. As the table shows, three of  the ten coefficients do not 
have the anticipated signs. Several factors may be involved here, besides the 
obvious possibility that the model is misspecified. First, the theory we  are 
using to predict the signs of these interactions is comparative static in nature 
and  does not  necessarily require that  the predicted effects be  contempora- 
neous. Second, even if the theory were to apply to contemporaneous relation- 
ships, the synchronization of  the available data leaves much to be desired.33 
For both of  these reasons, we believe it to be more appropriate to examine 
jointly the contemporaneous and lagged influence of one variable on another, 
by  using impulse response functions and decompositions of  the variance of 
forecast errors. 
Figure 6.1 shows the response of  real output to innovations in the base, 
M2, and the interest rate. Shocks to the levels of M2 and the base have posi- 
tive but permanent effects on output. Innovations in the interest rate have ap- 
proximately a zero output effect on net, although the response is initially pos- 
itive for four quarters. 
The relative importance of shocks assigned to each variable can be assessed 
from the decomposition of the variance of the forecast errors, which is shown 
in the lower panel of  Table 6.1. Here the columns correspond to the sources 
of the shocks (i.e., which element of V is responsible), and the row names are 
those of the variable being predicted. The horizon of the forecasts is twelve 
quarters in all cases. The salient feature of these results is that 26.8 percent of 
the variance of output forecast errors is assigned to base and M2 innovations. 
It is also worth noting that two-thirds of  the variability of  the interest rate 
comes from the innovations to the base and the money supply, while innova- 
tions to the interest rate have a considerably smaller effect. 
In summary, there is little in these results that would lead a monetarist to 
revise his or her views on the nature of the transmission mechanism. 
6.3.2  Credit Model 
Table 6.2 describes the results of  estimating a model designed to capture 
the effects of variables important to the credit view. This model was developed 
by  Calomiris and Hubbard and is described in detail in their paper.34  In their 
structural VAR, in addition to prices, output, and interest rates, they introduce 
three variables to capture the role of credit: real bank loans, a spread between 
risky and riskless assets of  similar maturity, and  the liabilities of  business 
failures. These variables capture both traditional credit interpretations and the 
determinants of equilibrium credit rationing. The spread and business failures 
variables are intended to capture the increased “agency costs” faced by lower 
33. For  example, output and prices are  quarterly averages, while the financial variables are 
34. Calomiris and Hubbard, ‘‘Price Flexibility,” pp. 429-52. 
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Table 6.1  Monetarist Model 
Interactions Among Contemporaneous Variables 
Equation  Base  M2  Real GNP  Commercial Paper  Deflator 
Base  1.077 
+
  0.118- 
(0.498)  (0.021) 
M2  0.43 
+
  0.886- 
(0.264)  (0.469) 
Real GNP  0.876-  0.531 -  0.017’ 
Commercial paper  -0.818-  -0.192- 
(0.633)  (0.833) 
GNP deflator  0.246’ 
(0.038) 
(2.51)  (3.49)  (0.02) 
Variance Decomposition (percent) 
Source of  Innovation 
Equation  Base  M2  Real GNP  Commercial Paper  Inflation 
Base  64.5  12.1  2.9 
M2  30.1  30.7  6.9 
Real GNP  8.5  18.3  52.2 
Commercial paper  35.8  32.0  4.8 
Inflation  11.0  2.9  2.2 
~______~__________~~ 
16.5  3.9 
24.5  7.8 
12.1  8.9 
18.8  8.8 
4.0  80.0 
Nores: The entries in the table are the negative of  the respective elements of  the transpose of r.  For 
example, the entry 0.43 means that the coefficient of the contemporaneous effect of Base growth on M2 
growth is 0.43. The plus sign to the right of a coefficient signifies that its expected sign is positive; the 
minus sign, negative. All variables except those involving interest rates are percentage rates of change. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
quality firms in their efforts to raise funds in a  They do not in- 
clude money in their model  on the assumption  that  the money  supply was 
endogenous under the classical gold ~tandard.~~ 
The model focuses on the effects of  the loan market on economic activity, 
and so relates the real volume of loans to the spread between interest rates on 
low- and high-grade loans, and the rate of business  failure^.^' Calomiris and 
Hubbard used a monthly  series on loans extended at national banks in New 
York, Boston, and Philadelphia, while we use total national bank loans for the 
35. See Frederic S.  Mishkin, “Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises: A Historical Per- 
spective,” in R. Glenn Hubbard, ed., Financial Crises and Financial Markers (Chicago, 1991). 
36. As evidence for this position,  they cite studies showing interest rate and price arbitrage 
between the United States and Britain, and unpublished evidence that gold shocks reversed them- 
selves within a short period of time. 
37. The spread variable was constructed from rates on different grades of commercial paper, 
which are only available for Calomiris and Hubbard’s 1894 to 1909 sample period. We used the 
spread between rates on low- and high-grade railroad bonds, constructed by Mishkin (see Appen- 
dix). 203  Money vs. Credit Rationing 
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Table 6.2  Credit Model 
Interactions among Contemporaneous Variables 
Real  Commercial  Real  Business 
Equation  Loans  Paper  Spread  Deflator  GNP  Failures 
Real loans 











  -0.001  - 
(0.006)  (0.003) 
(0.19) 
0.37-  -2.13-  0.38' 










(0.54  1 ) 
-0.246- 
Variance Decomposition (percent) 
Source of Innovation 
Real  Commercial  Real  Business 
Equation  Loans  Paper  Spread  Deflator  GNP  Failures 
Real loans  82.2  7.9  5.8  2. I  0.7  I .2 
Commercial paper  35.8  35.5  5.5  18.0  1.7  3.6 
Spread  12.2  13.0  69.1  2.2  1.4  2.2 
GNP deflator  10.7  4.5  1.9  16.2  2.7  3.9 
Real GNP  35.9  3.4  3.3  16.8  37.2  3.2 
Business failures  8.5  12.3  0.7  6.1  0.4  71.9 
Norest  See Table 6.  I. 
entire United States. Similarly, our output variable is real GNP, while their's 
is the monthly pig-iron  series. In spite of these differences, in addition to the 
fact that their sample spanned the 1894 to 1909 period,  the results from the 
two versions of the model are quite similar.38 
As with the basic monetarist model, not all structural coefficients are of the 
anticipated  signs, the most notable being the positive impact of  the interest 
rate on output. The impulse response functions show a healthy impact of loan 
innovations on output, and also exhibit the initial positive response to interest 
rate shocks found in the monetarist model (Fig. 6.2).  The most striking fea- 
ture of  the results  is the  35.9 percent  of  output  forecast-error  variance  ex- 
plained  by  loan  innovations.  Calomiris  and Hubbard  found  that  only  10.6 
38. A  minor difference between the two specifications is that we  do not  include the spread 
variable in the inflation equation, which aids the convergence of our estimation procedure. This 
interaction was not statistically significant in Calomiris and Hubbard's work. 205  Money vs. Credit Rationing 
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percent  of  this  variance  could  be  explained  by  real  loan  shocks in  their 
monthly data. We will have occasion to return to this difference in section 6.4 
below.  In summary, the basic credit model, applied to the national banking 
era, does not turn up any evidence that would lead one to doubt it. 
6.3.3  Hybrid Monetarist Model 
Table 6.3 describes the results  of  estimating  a hybrid  monetarist  model, 
expanded by adding credit variables. Thus, we add business failures and the 
spread variable to the five variables of the basic monetarist specification. In 
addition, we use the real money supply and base, since, from the credit view- 
point,  it is real balance sheet variables that are important.  Unfortunately,  we 
are not able to add the loans variable to the basic monetarist model, because 
of the close relationship between movements in the quantity of loans on the 
one hand, and the base and money supply on the other. Of course, this diffi- 
culty dogs all tests of the relative merits of  the two views.39  This omission is 
remedied in the fourth model, discussed below. 
The identification restrictions in the top part of Table 6.3 are driven by those 
in the two basic models. Thus, increases in business failures and the spread 
are anticipated by the credit view to have a depressing effect on M2, real GNP, 
39. See Alan Blinder and Joseph Stiglitz, “Money, Credit Constraints, and Economic Activity,” 
American  Economic  Review  73 (May  1983),  pp.  297-302;  and  Karl  Brunner  and  Allan H. 
Meltzer, “Money and Credit in the Monetary Transmission Process,” American Economic Review 
78 (June 1988). pp. 446-51. 206  M. D. Bordo, P.  Rappoport, and A. J. Schwartz 
Table 6.3  Hybrid Monetarist Model 
Interactions among Contemporaneous Variables 
Real  Real  Real  Commercial  Business 
Equation  Base  M2  GNP  Paper  Deflator  Failures  Spread 
Real base 
Real M2  -2.66' 
(6.88) 
Real GNP 
Commercial  0.514- 










-0.012-  -0.358- 
(0.24)  (0.28) 
-0.827-  0.149- 







-  1.25- 
(1.03) 
0.271-  0.100- 
(0.7)  (0.27) 
(0.18)  (0.06)  (0.03) 
-0.150+  -0.071-  -0.01- 
-0.054-  -0.023- 
(0.03)  (0.02) 
-0.017-  -0.429' 
(0.54)  (0.17) 
Variance Decomposition (percent) 
~  ~ 
Source of  Innovation 
Real  Real  Real  Commercial  Business 
Equation  Base  M2  GNP  Paper  Deflator  Failures  Spread 
Real base  13.6  73.1  1.5  2.3  4.3  3.2  1.9 
Real M2  4.4  48.2  5.8  17.9  10.4  1.9  11.3 
Real GNP  12.3  12.7  52.2  4.2  8.9  4.1  5.5 
Commercial 
Paper  32.4  24.6  5.4  8.7  10.9  5.4  12.5 
GNP de- 
flator  2.3  48.7  3.0  21.0  18.2  3.3  3.5 
Business 
failures  8.9  12.6  0.8  5.3  4.4  66.8  1.1 
Spread  10.4  4.2  0.5  3.0  4.8  3.4  73.7 
Notes:  See Table 6.1. 
and the deflator,  after the monetarist effects of the first model have been ac- 
counted for, while an increase in business failures is expected to increase the 
spread  between  rates  on low- and high-quality  bonds.  The dependence  of 
business failure and spread innovations on interest rate and price innovations 
is as specified in the basic credit model. A substantially higher proportion of 
the contemporaneous interactions have the wrong sign than in the basic mo- 
netarist model, the most egregious being the response of  M2 to the base, and 
of real output to money. However, there is a strong positive response of output 
to M2 innovations after two quarters have elapsed (Fig. 6.3). Money innova- 207  Money vs. Credit Rationing 
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tions appear to have a smaller permanent effect on the level of output, and the 
permanent effect of base innovations has disappeared.40 Similarly, the propor- 
tion of the output forecast-error variance explained by money and base inno- 
vations is 25 percent, little changed from the 26.8 percent found in the basic 
monetarist model. We also note that the variables added to represent the credit 
story-the  interest rate spread and the rate of business failures-together  ex- 
plain only 9.6 percent of the  variability of  real  GNP, which  approximately 
matches their performance in the basic credit model. 
6.3.4  Hybrid Credit Model 
Table 6.4 describes the results of expanding the basic credit model to in- 
clude the effects of changes in the quantity of money. The delicate issue here 
is whether loans and money should be expressed in real or nominal terms. The 
credit view holds that it is the real quantity of loans that is important for real 
output,  while the monetarist view focuses on the short-run output effects of 
changes in the nominal quantity of money. The specification of Table 6.4 casts 
both variables in nominal terms, but allows for real effects to be consistently 
estimated by including the inflation rate in the output and loans  equation^.^^ 
The responses of real GNP to nominal loans and money both die out after 
about three years, as Figure 6.4 shows. Loans exhibit a substantial permanent 
change in response to a money shock, but there is not a marked response of 
money to a loan shock.  Similarly, the variance decompositions in the lower 
panel of Table 6.4 show that 14.4 percent of loan variability is accounted for 
by  money  shocks, while only 5.9 percent  of  money  variability comes from 
loan shocks. This may, however, be a consequence of including money in the 
loan equation while excluding a contemporaneous effect of  loans on the sup- 
ply of money. For this reason, the model is to be understood as a monetarist 
generalization of the credit model. 
The variance  decomposition  also shows that  the fraction  of the forecast- 
error variance of real output attributable to loan shocks declines dramatically, 
from  35.9 percent  in  the  basic credit model  to  16 percent  when  money  is 
included. The contribution of  money shocks to the forecast-error variance of 
real output is 14.3 percent. These figures do not provide an exact comparison 
with the basic credit model, however, since in that model loans enter in real 
terms. To provide such a comparison, we recalculated the variance decompo- 
sition to assess the effect of real loan shocks on real output, leaving money in 
nominal terms. The results,  which are shown in the addendum to Table 6.4, 
are little changed, although the influence of  money  shocks declines slightly 
40. The permanent or long-run effect on the level of real GNP is the sum of the impulse re- 
sponses over the time horizon. 
41. We also ran the model using real loans, nominal money, and the deflator, and found that the 
deflator coefficient in the real loans equation was -  0.94. This suggests that deflation of the loans 
series was inappropriate in this model. 209  Money vs. Credit Rationing 
Table 6.4  Hybrid Credit Model 
Interactions among Contemporaneous Variables 
Commercial  Real  Business 
Equation  Loans  Paper  Spread  Deflator  GNP  Failures  M2 
~  ~~~  ~ 
Loans  -  1.35-  0.302'  0.053-  0.58' 
(2.95)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.16) 
Commercial  -0.184- 
Spread  0.0328'  -0.0124-  0.0024' 
GNP deflator  0.0169'  11.11'  -0.089-  0.433' 
Paper  (0.04) 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.002) 
(0.54)  (16.6)  (0.07)  (0.18) 
Real GNP  0.437  0.402-  -3.04-  -0.0717'  -0.0209-  -0.038' 
Business  0.136' 
failures  (0.03) 
M2  -0.236-  -  0.0749 + 
(0.09)  (0.22)  (2.72)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.16) 
(0.11)  (0.03) 
Variance Decomposition (percent) 
Commercial  Real  Business 
Equation  Loans  Paper  Spread  Deflator  GNP  Failures  M2 
Loans  49.6  5.4  6.4  10.3  1.5  0.5  14.4 
Com- 
mercial 
Paper  16.2  41.7  9.3  7.7  2.9  3.0  19.1 
Spread  9.6  9.9  57.1  10.8  1.2  2.9  8.5 
Inflation  0.9  4.1  9.5  70.4  2.7  3.8  8.6 
RealGNP  16.0  5.2  7.0  7.5  47.1  2.8  14.3 
Business 
failures  3.6  8.2  0.8  5.0  0.5  76.0  5.8 
M2  5.9  6.9  18.3  6.5  2.1  3.2  57.3 
Addendum: Model Using Real Loans 
Real out- 
Rut  18.5  3.1  9.4  6.0  47.1  2.9  13.0 
Notes: See Table 6.1. 
while that of real loan shocks is 2.5 percentage points larger than that of nom- 
inal loan shocks. 
The central message of  this "hybrid credit model"  is that the channel of 
influence on output that operates through the money  supply cannot be  ig- 
nored. Of  course, loan shocks still account for a respectable fraction of the 
variance of output forecast errors, even after money shocks have been allowed 
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holding the credit view.  However, it is always possible that the loan variable 
is picking up shocks to the base, which is not included in this model. 
The message of this section thus turns out to be generally negative as to the 
possibility  of a clear choice between the two schools of thought, using such 
aggregate data. The basic models both  appear reasonably soothing to mem- 
bers of the associated school. The hybrid monetarist model leaves the money 
story intact when the interest rate spread and business failures are added, but 
credit proponents could argue that the base variable is accounting for the ef- 
fects of loans. The hybrid credit model suggests that money effects are impor- 
tant in addition to those said to operate through the asset side of the banks’ 
balance sheets, but it is not a plank of the credit platform to say that money 
does not matter at all. The close comovement between loans, money, and the 
base also clouds the interpretation here: monetarists could argue that the incre- 
mental explanatory  power of  the loans variable  arises because its inclusion 
helps to separate base shocks from money demand shocks. 
It therefore appears that other data must be consulted, if we are ultimately 
to be able to assess the relative merits of the two views. We offer a first step in 
this direction in the next section, by examining the composition of loans. 
6.4  The Role of the Stock Market and Call Loan Market in the 
Institutional Framework, 1880 to 1914 
The results of the VARs in the preceding section,  if taken  at face value, 
suggest that both  bank  loans and money are important  in the  transmission 
mechanism.  However, the institutional structure of the national banking era 
directs attention to the fundamental reason for the importance of bank loans 
in this period-the  intimate connection between the stock market and the na- 
tional banking system established by the inverted pyramid of  credit and the 
New York City call loan market. Disturbances to the stock market were trans- 
mitted to the call loan market, which in turn had a dramatic impact on total 
bank loans in New York City and in the rest of the country. 
A key feature of the regulations that defined the national banking  system 
was the imposition of different reserve requirements on three separate classes 
of national banks. Specifically, the Act of 1874 required country banks to hold 
15 percent against their deposits, three-fifths of which, or 9 percent, could be 
held as bankers’ balances with correspondent national banks in reserve cities 
(with populations greater than 50,000) or in central-reserve cities (New York 
City and, after  1887, also Chicago and  St. Louis).  These balances  earned 
interest up to 2 percent. The remaining two-fifths of required reserves were to 
be held in lawful money (U.S. notes, specie, gold, and clearing-house certifi- 
cates). Reserve-city national banks were required to hold 25 percent of their 
deposits in reserves, half of which had to be held in lawful money, the other 
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banks. Central-reserve-city national banks were required to hold 25 percent of 
their deposits in lawful money.42  Country and reserve-city  banks kept excess 
reserves  far above the required  levels  in the form of  bankers’  balances  in 
central-reserve  cities. These funds were a form of  secondary reserves.  The 
reserve structure of  the national banking system has been described as an in- 
verted pyramid, whereby most of the nation’s reserves ended up as bankers’ 
balances in the central-reserve cities, but especially in New York City.43 
Most of  the reserves held as bankers’ balances in New York City national 
banks were invested in the call loan market.  Call loans were demand loans 
secured by stock traded on the New York  Stock Exchange and also by U.S. 
and other bonds. Most of  the loans were made to brokers who would  then 
consign the stock serving as collateral to the banks.  The commercial  banks 
considered call loans the most liquid form of  investment, since they could be 
called  at any time. The New  York  national  banks  dominated  the call  loan 
market,  with between a third and a half of  their loan portfolios in call loans 
during the period we cover.+’ Close to 75 percent of  bankers’ balances in New 
York  were held in call loans between  1880 and 1904, the amount to be ex- 
pected if the New York banks held the required 25 percent reserve requirement 
against those balances.  In addition, country and reserve-city national banks 
and state commercial, savings, and trust companies invested directly in the 
call loan market (using their central-reserve-city  correspondents  as interme- 
diaries)  whenever  the call  loan  rate  rose  significantly  above the  2 percent 
earned on bankers’ balances. Thus an inverse relationship existed between the 
call loan rate and bankers’ balances in New York City, and a direct one be- 
tween the call loan rate and country bank excess reserves invested directly in 
the call loan market.45 
The inverted pyramid as well as the correspondent balance arrangement and 
its intimate  connection to the  call loan  market  are widely regarded  as key 
elements in financial crises that punctuated the era.46 All the major banking 
42.  Although Chicago and St. Louis were important regional centers, New York held the lion’s 
share of bankers’ balances.  National banks in central-reserw cities also held substantial corre- 
spondent balances of  state banks, private banks, and trust companies. 
43.  The inverted pyramid was a natural outgrowth of  the extensive correspondent network 
developed before the Civil War. See John James, Money and Capital Markers (Princeton,  1978), 
chap. 4; and Margaret Myers, The New York Money Market (New York,  1935),  chap. 12. In the 
unit-banking system that arose earlier in the century, holding balances with city correspondents 
represented a valuable way in which a country bank could gain access to an interregional clearing 
mechanism (obtain domestic exchange and clear out-of-town checks), obtain additional sources 
of credit (by interbank loans and rediscounts, although rarely extended in this period), and earn 
interest on excess reserves.  The city banks on their part had access to the interior and secured 
compensation for their services to the country banks. The national banks thus extended an existing 
framework. 
44.  Myers, The New York Money Market, p. 290. 
45.  Myers, The New York Money Marker, p. 290; James, Money and Capital Markets, p. 304. 
46.  Oliver M.  W.  Sprague, History of  Crises Under the National Banking System. National 
Monetary Commission, 61st Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. 538  (Washington, D.C., 1910);  Myers, The 
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panics of the period (1873,  1884, 1893, 1907) were marked by  withdrawals 
of  bankers’ balances (especially those representing excess reserves) by  the 
country and reserve-city banks from the New  York  banks. The decline in 
bankers’ balances in turn put pressure on the call loan market, causing call 
loan rates to rise and stock prices to fall-possibly  inducing a stock market 
crash. The decline in New York bank reserves could on occasion be so severe 
as to precipitate a panic, which could only be  stopped by  the restriction of 
convertibility of deposits into currency. 
The evidence is mixed on whether the combined incidence of stock market 
crashes and banking panics during the national banking era reflects causation 
from the banking system or vice versa.47  Although there were twice as many 
crashes as there were panics, all of  the major banking panics also occurred 
close to stock market crashes. On two occasions (1899 and 1901), syndicates 
of  prominent financial institutions were able to reverse the pressure on the 
New  York  call loan  On other occasions, panic was averted by  the 
issue of  clearing-house certificates by  the New  York  Clearing House and/or 
by Treasury intervention (1  884,  1890). However, on three occasions (1  873, 
1893, 1907), this intervention was insufficient to prevent panic. Only a restric- 
tion of convertibility of deposits into currency sufficed. 
This experience suggests that a potential source of volatility in bank loans 
may lie in call loans. If  that is the case, this makes questionable the impor- 
tance of credit rationing. To consider this possibility we examine more closely 
the composition of loans in New  York  City national banks and in  national 
banks in the rest of the country. 
Bank loans were either demand or time loans, some secured by  different 
types of collateral: stocks and bonds, merchandise, and receivables. The latter 
two categories of secured loans were typically issued on the real bills principle 
that they would be ~elf-liquidating.~~  The balance sheets of the New York City 
national banks had similar categories to those of the country national banks, 
but the composition was quite different, reflecting the absence of  excess re- 
serves in New York City. 
Of the categories of assets just noted, credit rationing would refer to loans 
47.  Jack W.  Wilson, Richard E. Sylla, and Charles P.  Jones,  “Financial Market Panics and 
Volatility in the Long Run,  1830-1988,”  in  Eugene N.  White,  ed., Crashes and Panics: The 
Lessons from History  (New York,  1990). According to Calomiris and Gorton, “The Origins of 
Banking Panics,” however, banking panics happened only if there had been prior bad news in the 
stock market combined with increased commercial failures. 
48. Myers, The New YorkMoney Market, p. 286. 
49. Other earning assets of the national banks were discounts and investments. Discounts were 
usually not secured by collateral, and differed from loans in that the interest charge was collected 
in advance. Discounts consisted primarily of commercial paper, either in the form of trade accept- 
ances or lenders’ acceptances. Commercial paper bore either two names or one name, with the 
latter eclipsing the former by the end of  the period. These instruments usually traded in an active 
national market, and the commercial paper rate fluctuated widely, reflecting changing conditions 
in the money market. Investments consisted of  eligible U.S. securities required to back the note 
issue and other U.S. securities held as a form of secondary reserves. 214  M. D. Bordo, P. Rappoport, and A. J. Schwartz 
secured primarily by  merchandise,  since discounts and call loan rates were 
determined in active national  markets. We  show in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 data 
for one call date annually (usually in September),  1880 to  1914, two cate- 
gories of  national bank  loans, as well  as total  national  bank  loans for New 
York City and for all national banks.50  The two categories are loans secured 
by stocks and other 10ans.~' 
The pattern that emerges from these figures is quite striking. New York City 
loans secured by  stock are highly  volatile,  exhibiting  sharp declines in  the 
panic years 1884, 1893, and 1907, and slight declines in two years with stock 
market crashes and no banking panics (1895 and 1899). Other New York City 
loans by  contrast  are distinctly  stable, with  a mild  upward  trend, and  the 
movement  of  total  New  York  City  loans reflects  that of  loans  secured  by 
For the United  States as a whole, the pattern of loans secured by  stock is 
much less volatile than for New York City, but declines in the panic years can 
be discerned. Other loans have a stable upward trend. While total U.S. loans 
pick up some of the volatility of New York City loans, they are considerably 
more stable.53 
The stable pattern of other loans compared to loans secured by stock in New 
York City and, to a lesser extent,  a similar difference in the composition of 
loans in the United  States as a whole, in country banks, and in the United 
States minus New  York  City, suggest that whatever procyclical  influence is 
exhibited by loans in New York City and for the United States as a whole can 
be explained by the behavior of  the call loan market. On the face of  it, this 
50. The source is U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Report, 1880 to 1914. 
51. For 1880-88,  the Comptroller showed four categories of loans: (I) loans on  U.S. bonds on 
demand; (2) loans on other stocks, bonds, etc., on demand; (3) loans on single-name paper with- 
out other security; and (4) all other loans. From 1891 to 1914, the Comptroller showed five cate- 
gories: (1)  loans on demand paper with one or more individual or firm names; (2) loans on de- 
mand, secured by stocks, bonds, and other securities; (3) loans on time, paper with two or more 
individual or firm names; (4) loans on time, single-name paper (person or firm) without other 
security; and (5) loans on time, secured by  stocks, bonds, and other personal securities, or on 
mortgages or other real estate securities. For 1889 and  1890, the Comptroller showed different 
categories, not readily comparable to those of the preceding and subsequent periods, and they are 
consequently omitted from the figures. 
The first category of  loans that we show in Figure 6.5-loans  secured by stocks-consists  for 
1880 to 1888 of categories (1) and (2). and for 1891 to 1914 of categories (2) and (5). The second 
category in Figure 6.5-other  loans-consists  for  1880 to  1888 of categories (3) and  (4). for 
1891 to 1914 of categories (I), (3), and (4). 
We  compared demand loans secured by  stock (is., call loans)-category  (2)-with  the rest. 
The pictures are similar to those presented here. We also drew similar figures for country banks 
and total United States minus New  York  City.  However, to save  space we discuss but do not 
present the former, and the pattern of the latter, which includes country banks, reserve-city banks, 
and central-reserve cities other than New York, can be inferred from the figures we present. 
52. Within the category of other loans, one of the subcategories exhibited more volatility than 
the total. 
53. For country banks, loans secured by stock were also more volatile than other loans, but the 
difference between the two categories was not as marked as for New York City. Results are similar 
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leaves little room for an independent influence on output variability of  credit 
rationing. 
There remains, however,  the link between the decline in the valuation of 
firms reflected in a fall in stock prices and declines in real output. On the one 
hand, this does not  impinge directly on the credit-rationing  story, which is 
typically limited to borrowers  who must resort to bank  loans. On the other 
hand, some have argued that a stock market crash can increase agency costs, 
causing investment and real activity to decline.54  To measure the importance 
of  this channel of  influence on real output, it is necessary to control for that 
part of  stock price movements that is due to changes in fundamentals, a sub- 
ject for possible future research. 
To  demonstrate the link  between  the  stock market  and loans  secured by 
stock, we plot in Figure 6.7 annual data in natural logs of New York City loans 
secured by stock and the stock price index. Figure 6.8 makes a similar com- 
parison between  U.S. loans secured by stock and the stock price index. As 
can readily be seen in Figure 6.7, volatility in the stock price index is reflected 
in the New  York  City  stock loan series.  The relationship  is somewhat less 
transparent in Figure 6.8 for U.S.  loans secured by stock. 
One inference that can be drawn from Figures 6.7 and 6.8 is that the signif- 
icant results obtained  for bank loans and other credit variables  in the VARs 
reported in section 6.3 reflect stock market disturbances, where the principal 
stocks traded were railway stocks. These disturbances in turn could be reflect- 
ing earlier or contemporaneous monetary shocks, or future output  It 
is a mistake, however, to argue that the waves of railroad construction in the 
late nineteenth century were independent of financial markets, on the ground 
that “there was no central bank to mistakenly squeeze off  economic activity 
by letting the money  supply grow too slowly.”s6 The stock market reflected 
banking panics  and concerns about the stability of the gold standard in the 
United States from 1890 to 1897. External finance that the stock market pro- 
vided either advanced or retarded railroad construction. 
It appears from this discussion that the principal source of volatility  in the 
series of total loans is the category of  loans collateraled by stock, the effects 
of which  are not  part of the credit story. The collateral for these loans was 
publicly priced and not in any way idiosyncratic to the individual loan con- 
tract. Nor do the characteristics of the borrower of  such a loan enter into the 
pricing and loan contract in any obvious way. Instead, it is the business loans 
represented by “other loans” that more faithfully re!ate  to the credit view. This 
54. See Jaffee and Stiglitz, “Credit Rationing,” and Mishkin, “Asymmetric Information.” 
55. Sprague argues the former in History ofCrises.  while G. William Schwert takes the latter 
view in “Stock Returns and Real Activity: A Century of Evidence,” Journal ofFinance 45 (Sept. 
56.  See J.  Bradford  De  Long,  “‘Liquidation’  Cycles: Old-Fashioned Real Business Cycle 
1990). pp.  1237-57. 
Theory and the Great Depression,” NBER Working Paper no. 3546 (Dec. 1990),  p. 29. 217  Money vs. Credit Rationing 
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is so even if loans collateraled by stock were not used for stock purchases but, 
as money is fungible, were applied to business use. 
Ideally, instead of the aggregate loans series used in the estimation exercise 
of  the preceding  section, it would be desirable to rerun it with data on other 
loans. Unfortunately,  quarterly data on disaggregated categories of  loans are 
not available for this period.  Instead, we have formulated  a structural VAR 
model, which includes, in addition to the quarterly growth of aggregate loans, 
the quarterly change in stock prices and the call loan rate. The latter variables 
are proxies for the pattern of stock market loans, and so their inclusion should 
go some way toward “filtering” the stock market loans from the series of total 
loans. 
The  complete  model,  which  also  includes  real  GNP growth,  real  M2 
growth, and the interest rate spread, is shown in Table 6.5. The call loan rate 
is, in effect, serving both as an instrument  for stock market loans and as a 
proxy for the commercial paper rate. The exclusion of inflation and the rate of 
business failures is explained by the need to limit the size of  the model. The 
results of  the preceding  section suggest that the omission of these two vari- 
ables is of little consequence. 
As Figure 6.9 shows, the response of output to real money shocks does not 
wash out  in the long run, while the output response  to loan innovations is 
more muted and transitory.  The variance decomposition shows that  15.7 per- 
cent of the real loan forecast-error variance is accounted for by stock price and 
call  loan rate innovations.  While direct comparisons  cannot be made rigor- 
ously between models that are not nested, it is nevertheless instructive to use 
the basic  credit  model  of  section 6.3 as a benchmark. In that  model, 84.5 
percent of loan variance comes from loan innovations; with the inclusion of 
money and the proxies for stock market loans, this proportion  falls to 52.2 
per~ent.~’  There is also a marked strengthening of  the link between loans and 
the spread-19.1  percent of loan variability comes from spread innovations, 
and  30.3 percent  of  spread  variability  comes from loan innovations in the 
stock market  model.  In contrast, these proportions  are 4.4 percent and 8.8 
percent, respectively,  in the basic credit model.  These results are consistent 
with the discussion above of the significance of stock market loans: the loans 
variable needs to be purged of  the effects of stock market loans in order to 
extract the essence of the credit interpretation. 
The bottom  line is surely the proportion  of output forecast-error  variance 
explained  by  loan innovations,  which  is 9.2 percent  in this  model, signifi- 
cantly lower than the 35.9 percent registered in the basic credit model and the 
16.0 percent in the hybrid credit model. It is also of interest to note that, when 
the stock market model is run with loans by New York City banks-a  series 
similar to that used by  Calomiris and Hubbard  (as noted  above, with a far 
57. Note that this also happens in the hybrid credit model, when money alone is included 219  Money vs. Credit Rationing 
Table 6.5  Stock Market Model 
Interactions among Contemporaneous Variablesa 
Equation  Real Loans  Stock Price  Real GNP  Real M2  Spread  Call Rate 
Real loans  0.15'  -0.063'  24.8-  -0.20- 
Stock price  0.70' 
Real GNP  0.317'  -0.158'  0.17-  0.683- 
Real M2  0.564'  -0.028- 
Spread  -0.019-  -0.003-  0.003' 
Call rate  0.029' 
Variance Decomposition (percent) 
Source of Innovation 
Equation  Real Loans  Stock Price  Real GNP  Real M2  Spread  Call Rate 
Real loans  52.2  9.5 
Stock price  4.9  70.3 
Real GNP  9.2  14.0 
Real M2  30.6  6.8 
Spread  30.3  24.8 
Call rate  6.3  12.3 
I .6  11.3 
5.8  11.4 
54.  I  16.8 
5.4  43.0 
2.6  3.2 
2.2  8.2 
~~ 
19.1  6.2 
2.5  5.0 
1.7  4.1 
10.4  3.7 
36.2  2.8 
2.7  66.3 
Addendum: Model Using Real NYC Loans 
Real GNP  4.5  13.1  57.0  16.0  4.2  5.1 
Nores: See Table 6.1. 
'While a number of starting values converged to those reported in the table, which corresponded to the 
maximum found for the likelihood function, numerical computation of standard errors proved infeasible, 
as it was not possible to invert the Hessian. 
greater proportion of their loan volume in the call loan market than was the 
case for total U.S. loans)-the  contribution of loan innovations to the output 
forecast-error variance drops to 4.5 percent.58  Indeed a substantial fraction of 
the variability in total U.S. loans is accounted for by movements in New York 
City loans, which in turn are largely composed of stock market loans. While 
accounting for only one-sixth of  total loans, the variance of  New York City 
loans accounts for one-fourth of the variance of U.S. loans. 
In  summary, an examination of  the breakdown of  loans into their various 
categories reveals that loans other than stock market loans are not closely re- 
lated to output fluctuations during the national banking period. In contrast, 
the contribution of money to output variability is consistently in the range of 
12 to  18 percent, and the combined contribution of  money and the base is 
about 25 percent. 
58. In this specification, the spread and loans variables once again explain minimal proportions 
of each other's forecast-error variance. 220  M. D. Bordo, P.  Rappoport, and A. J. Schwartz 
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6.5  Conclusion 
A growing theoretical literature of the past decade assigns a major role to 
credit rationing  by banks, defined as a reduction in bank lending with little 
change in interest rates, in influencing the course of  the real economy. The 
theory, elaborated  in the context of existing banking and monetary arrange- 
ments, is far more developed than empirical verification  of its propositions. 
The most advanced efforts at empirical verification apply the method of struc- 
tural VARs to a limited number of variables designed to show that credit vari- 
ables account for a preponderance of output forecast-error variance. Our point 
of departure is the application of the method by Calomiris and Hubbard to the 
national banking period. 
We broaden the inquiry to encompass not only credit but also money vari- 
ables, and apply the structural VAR methodology to assess the relative merits 
of money and credit explanations of real activity during the national banking 
period. This approach requires identification assumptions to be made concern- 
ing the contemporaneous interactions  among variables.  Since this approach 
also implies that the resulting system of simultaneous equations contains no 
substantive misspecification, it is well to test the robustness of the conclusions 
drawn from any one model by changing the identification  assumptions.  Ex- 
perience with the models used in this paper counsels that one place stock only 
in those conclusions that are consistent with all models. 
Table 6.6 summarizes our findings by  showing the decomposition  of the 
output forecast-error variance attributable to each model. The salient feature 
of the estimation results is that the explanatory power of  money and the base 
is  moderate and robust  to changes in  that  specification of  the  underlying 
model.  Similarly,  we repeatedly  fail  to find a sizeable  output effect of  the 
spread and business failures variables.  Last, the effect of loan variability on 
output fluctuations is highly sensitive to changes in specification, and declines 
dramatically when money is introduced into the model and stock market loans 
are controlled for. 
These results motivate the conclusion that there is little support during the 
national banking era for the “credit-rationing’’ view of the transmission mech- 
anism, that the asset side of banks’ balance sheets is a significant determinant 
of output fluctuations. This inference, drawn from the variance decomposition 
of  our structural  VAR  exercises, is supported  by  direct examination  of  the 
course of “other loans” (which we take to represent business loans) over the 
national banking period. Other loans exhibit little, if  any, volatility,  and so 
they cannot explain output fluctuations. 
Our findings raise a number of issues that cannot be addressed within the 
confines of  the present  study. We  have not examined whether interest rates 
flatten out instead of continuing to rise as output growth reaches a peak, which 
is a critical implication of the credit story. The VAR  methodology is limited 
to an examination of  short-run  interactions among macroeconomic  time se- 
ries. The basis of the equilibrium credit-rationing  story is microeconomic in 222  M. D. Bordo, P.  Rappoport, and A. J. Schwartz 
Table 6.6  Money versus Credit: Contributions to the Forecast-Error Variance of Real 
GNP  (%) 
Commercial  Interest 
Real  Monetary  Paper  GNP  Rate  Business  Stock Call 
Model  GNP  Base  M2  Loans  Rate  Deflator  Spread  Failures  Price  Rate 
Monetarist  52.2  8.5  18.3  12.1  8.9 
Credit  37.2  35.9  3.4  16.8  3.3  3.2 
Hybrid monetarist  52.2  12.3  12.7  4.2  8.9  5.5  4.1 
Hybrid Credit  47.1  14.3  16.0  5.2  7.5  7.0  2.8 
Stock Market 
Stock Market 
(U.S. loans)  54.1  16.8  9.2  1.7  14.0  4.1 
(NYC loans)  57.0  16.0  4.5  4.2  13.1  5.1 
Nore: Estimated from structural VAR models using quarterly data from 1880 to 1914. A forecast horizon 
of three years is used. 
nature,  and  our data  provide  little  that  can  directly  address  the  question 
whether banks refrain from lending, beyond a certain point, irrespective of 
their reserve positions. 
Similarly, we find striking the lack of  fluctuation in “other loans,” a series 
that seems to grow with GNP. This may reflect an extreme form of customer 
relations between  lenders and borrowers,  or it may be a consequence of the 
relative ease of  acquiring loans in a growing economy whose banking sector 
more than quadrupled over the period of our study. It appears that these issues 
would most fruitfully be addressed by a study of banks’ historical records. 
Finally,  we can ask whether it was the asset or the liability side of  bank 
balance  sheets that  contemporaries during  the  national  banking  period  re- 
garded as problematical.  For them, it was unquestionably the liability side, in 
particular, the inflexibility during financial crises of the banks’ bond-secured 
note issues. 
The policy  conclusion that  contemporaries  reached  was embodied in the 
Federal Reserve Act of  1913. That legislation provided for the issue of asset- 
backed Federal Reserve notes that were expected to vary with changes in de- 
mand. Credit rationing by banks was neither a concern nor a policy issue.s9 In 
the new  regime, the prescription  was once again for loans to be based  on 
short-term self-liquidating bills. No essential change was made in the regula- 
tions prevailing under the national banking system with regard to credit. 
59. Calomiris and Hubbard quote examples of  “credit rationing and credit market segmenta- 
tion” which they state “appear frequently in Sprague” (“Price Flexibility,” p. 437); see his History 
of  Crises. However, we interpret the relevance of these quotations somewhat less broadly than do 
Calomiris and Hubbard. All  are drawn  from Sprague’s chapter on the panic of  1907 and are 
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